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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Basel framework, capital requirements are a key tool to increase the resilience of the banking 
sector. Whereas the focus of minimum capital requirements is on the solvency position of individual 
banks, macroprudential requirements on top of the microprudential ones aim at preserving stability 
of the banking sector and financial stability as a whole. More specifically, the accumulation of capital 
buffers makes banks more resilient to negative shocks, thereby limiting the impact of downturns on 
the financial system and on the broader economy.  
Macroprudential capital requirements, while sharing the ultimate objective of safeguarding the 
stability of the financial system, differ in, inter alia, their scope of application. On the one hand, 
capital requirements can have a broad focus, applying to banks’ total risk weighted assets (RWA), as 
in the case of the countercyclical capital buffer and capital surcharges for globally or domestically 
systemically important institutions. On the other hand, capital requirements can be designed to 
shield the financial sector from risks emerging from specific sectoral exposures. In such cases, the 
additional requirement does not apply to banks’ total RWA but instead on specific portfolios in their 
balance sheets. 
Due to the detriment that systemic risks stemming from excessive developments in real estate 
markets can exert on financial stability1, sectoral capital requirements have been increasingly 
considered as macroprudential instruments to address vulnerabilities related to real estate 
exposures. In recent years, several European countries activated capital-based macroprudential 
instruments targeting real estate assets 2 , either directly, by setting higher capital ratio 
requirements for the concerned segments (e.g. the activation of a countercyclical capital buffer in 
Switzerland, with its scope of application to assets secured by real estate property), or indirectly, by 
adjusting parameters, such as risk weights (RW)3, which affect capital requirements for real estate 
exposures (e.g. a 25 percent RW floor on mortgage loans in Sweden; tighter criteria for the 
application of preferential RW to residential property in Croatia, Ireland and the UK; increased RW 
for exposures secured by commercial real estate properties in Ireland, Norway, Romania and 
Sweden). 
                                                                  
1 See for example Crowe et al.  (2013) and Hartmann (2015).  Claessens et al.  (2009) show that financial and economic busts 
preceded by a real estate boom are particularly harmful from a financial stability perspective since they are longer and 
costlier than the average downturn. On the interplay between mortgage loan financing, leverage, real estate prices and the 
macro-economy, see for example Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aoki et al. (2004), Davis and Heathcote (2005), Iacoviello (2005), 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Forlati and Lambertini, 2011), Kannan and Rabanal (2012). 
2 See ESRB (2016), “A Review of Macroprudential Policy in the EU in 2015” provides for a comprehensive overview of macroprudential policy 
in Europe. 
3 See Anderson et al. (2012) and Bank of England (2011) on the use of risk weights as macroprudential instruments.  
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In December 2013, the National Bank of Belgium introduced a macroprudential measure aimed at 
strengthening the resilience of Belgian banks against adverse developments in the real estate 
market. The measure imposed a 5 percentage point add-on to the RW on Belgian residential real 
estate exposures for banks calculating regulatory capital requirements through an internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach. While the effects of capital-based measures in terms of increased capital 
available to absorb potential losses are readily measurable (for example, the Belgian measure 
entailed  an  increase  in  the  average  RW for  IRB  banks  from 10  percent  at  the  end  of  2012  to  15  
percent at the end of 20134), their consequences on the supply and pricing of credit, being either 
intended or unintended, are more difficult to assess. This is due to the challenges of isolating the 
impact of policy changes from that of other developments that might have affected banks’ lending 
behaviour during the same period.  
This paper aims at quantifying the impact of the introduction of the macroprudential add-on to RW 
for domestic residential real estate exposures in Belgium on the pricing of mortgage loans granted by 
Belgian  IRB  banks.  Using  bank-level  data  on  mortgage  lending  rates,  regulatory  capital  
requirements and bank balance sheet characteristics, we find that the RW add-on has affected IRB 
banks  heterogeneously.  In  particular,  IRB  banks  that  are  relatively  more  affected  by  the  
macroprudential measure, i.e. banks that are either mortgage-specialised and/or face higher 
minimum regulatory capital ratio requirements, raise mortgage loan spreads by a greater amount. 
In  contrast,  IRB  banks  that  are  less  capital-constrained,  i.e.  banks  that  have  a  larger  voluntary  
management buffer to absorb the higher capital requirement implied by the RW add-on, raise 
lending spreads by less. In terms of economic significance, the impact of the RW add-on on mortgage 
loan pricing appears to be relatively limited: results based on our full data sample suggest an 
average increase in mortgage loan spreads of 12 basis points, ranging between 0 and 35 basis points 
across individual IRB banks. Robustness checks on the length of the control sample suggest a more 
homogeneous impact across IRB banks, with only a few banks raising spreads by more than 10 basis 
points. 
By analysing the impact of a sectoral macroprudential measure on mortgage loan pricing, this paper 
contributes  to  the  literature  on  the  impact  of  capital  requirements  on  bank  lending.  The  vast  
majority of this literature has focused on the changes to overall capital requirements, either 
following the introduction of the new Basel regulation, or due to changes in individual banks’ capital 
requirements. The analysis of the effects of sectoral capital requirements in general, and of those 
targeting real estate exposures in particular, is much less explored. This is not surprising, given the 
relatively recent experience with the introduction of such instruments, which leads to a scarcity of 
                                                                  
4 See the National Bank of Belgium’s “Financial Stability Report”, 2014. 
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observations for a proper ex post policy assessment. To our knowledge, this paper is among the first 
to provide empirical evidence on the impact of introducing a sectoral macroprudential capital 
requirement on lending spreads. Documenting the impact of such macroprudential requirements is 
crucial for gaining experience with these instruments and for improving the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies in general. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the recent literature 
on the effects of capital requirements on bank lending, with a specific focus on mortgage loan pricing. 
In Section 3 we explain in more detail the Belgian macroprudential measure that is the focus of this 
paper.  Sections  4  and  5  present  the  data  and  empirical  specification  underlying  our  analysis,  of  
which the results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2 LITERATURE ON THE EFFECTS OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
ON BANK LENDING 
Due to the increased emphasis on macroprudential policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis, a 
new body of studies examining the costs and the benefits of such policy interventions has flourished. 
However, a broad consensus has not yet been reached, neither regarding the positive effects of 
capital requirements on reducing the probability and the cost of crises, nor concerning the 
transmission  of  capital-based  policy  measures  on  the  price  and  volume  of  credit  (e.g.  Galati  and  
Moessner (2014); Tressel and Yuanyan (2016)).  
On the benefits side, capital requirements are expected to foster financial stability by reducing the 
probability of banks’ financial distress and by minimizing their losses given default. However, the 
evidence on both the effect of capital requirements on banks’ ex ante risk taking behaviour and on 
the ex post effectiveness in improving financial system resilience is mixed. While some studies 
confirm the positive effect of capital requirements in reducing banks’ risk taking (e.g. De Haan and 
Klomp  (2012)),  banks’  financial  fragility  (e.g.  De  Jonghe  (2010);  Miles  et  al.  (2012),  Diamond  and  
Rajan (2001)); Baker and Wurgler (2013)) and the cost of banking crises (e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994); Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004); Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010); Beltratti et al. (2012); 
Kapan and Minoiu (2013)), others find either non-significant or even opposite results (e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2011)). 
The costs entailed by higher capital requirements can be quantified in terms of forgone lending and, 
possibly, reduced economic activity. Banks’ behaviour following the policy change is a key 
determinant  of  its  transmission  to  lending  volumes  and  lending  rates.  For  an  increase  in  capital  
requirements to exert an effect on banks’ lending decisions, banks need to consider equity more 
expensive than debt or that their voluntary management buffer held above minimum regulatory 
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requirements falls below an internal or external target level. In a recent theoretical study by Baker 
and Wurgler (2015), simulations using US data suggest that a one percentage point increase in the 
ratio of capital RWA leads to a raise of lending spreads between 6 and 9 basis points.  In the context 
of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated with Euro Area data, Mendicino et al. 
(forthcoming) quantify the effect of a one percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to RWA on 
mortgage lending spreads to be equal to 2.8 basis points. Focusing more specifically on RW, 
Anderson et al. (2012), argue that changes in sectoral RW can affect banks’ behaviour by altering the 
relative return on equity from different assets. The asset composition effect of increasing RW is 
illustrated, for example, by Mendicino et al. (forthcoming). They show that profit maximizing banks 
tend to rebalance their investment portfolio according to the relative return on equity of different 
assets. As an increase in RW on domestic residential exposures lowers the return on equity for that 
asset class, banks may be encouraged to reduce such exposures to the advantage of other exposures 
(e.g. credit to non-financial corporations).  
The empirical assessment of the effect of capital requirements on lending volumes and interest rates 
is challenging not only due to the shortage and/or strict confidentiality of data on past changes in 
bank capital requirements, let alone macroprudential capital requirements, but also because, for the 
observed changes, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the regulation from other, broader, 
developments (e.g. Noss and Toffano (2016)). However, the increased availability of policy changes 
involving capital requirements, led an increasing number of authors to explore their effects on banks’ 
behaviour in terms of supply and pricing of credit. More specifically, this growing strand of literature 
based on a diversity of countries suggests that capital-based macroprudential regulation does affect 
bank lending and loan pricing.5 De-Ramon et al. (2012) estimate the relationship between lending 
spreads and aggregate bank capital ratios using UK data from 1992 to 2012. They find that, in the 
long run, UK spreads increased by 9.4 basis points for a one percentage point increase in total 
capital requirements. Šutorova and Teply (2013) estimate that lending rates increase by 19 basis 
points for a one percentage point increase in capital resources using a sample of 594 European banks 
for the period 2006 to 2011. Cosimano and Hakura (2011) find that the new capital requirements 
introduced under the Basel III framework, by raising banks’ marginal cost of funding, lead to higher 
lending rates. Considering a sample of large banks for 12 OECD countries, they estimate that the 
average increase in large banks’ equity to asset ratio required by the new capital regulation (+1.3 
percentage points) would lead large banks to increase their lending rates by 16 basis points. 
Focusing on a smaller set of 3 OECD countries, Slovik and Cournède (2011) estimate that the 
                                                                  
5 In the discussion of this literature, we focus on the impact of capital requirements on loan pricing. For exhaustive overviews 
of the literature, including on the impact on lending volumes and growth, see for instance Martynova (2015) and Basel 
Committe of Banking Supervision (2016). 
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macroeconomic impact of the implementation of Basel III is mainly driven by an increase in bank 
lending spreads. More specifically, they find that, to meet the capital requirements effective as of 
2019 (7  percent  for  the common equity  ratio,  8.5  percent  for  the Tier  1  capital  ratio)  banks would 
potentially increase lending spreads by about 50 basis points. Still focusing on the implementation of 
Basel  III,  King  (2010)  finds  that  a  representative  bank  could  recover  the  higher  cost  of  funds  
associated with a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio by increasing lending spreads by 
15 basis points. Using data on large US financial institutions, Kashyap et al. (2010) estimate that a 
one percentage point increase in banks’ capital requirement leads to an increase in bank lending 
rates comprised between 2.5 and 2.4 basis points in the long-run.   
Most of these empirical studies focus on assessing the impact of overall minimum regulatory capital 
requirements: given the rather recent experience with macroprudential capital requirements, and 
specifically sectoral capital requirements targeting mortgage lending, evidence on the impact of 
sectoral macroprudential capital requirements is scarce. Martins and Schechtman (2013) analyse the 
impact  of  a  macroprudential  increase  of  RW  targeting  auto  loans  with  long  maturities  and  high  
LTVs in Brazil. They find that banks increased spreads on affected loans by at least 13 percent 
compared to spread on loans that were not affected by the measure. While considering neither 
sectoral nor macroprudential capital requirements, Uluc and Wieladek (2015) investigate the impact 
capital requirements on mortgage loans in the UK. Their results suggest that a rise in an affected 
bank’s capital requirement of 100 basis points leads to a decline in loan size of about 5.4%, while 
loans issued by competing banks that are not affected by the change in capital requirement rise by 
roughly the same amount, suggesting that competition in the local lending market may mute 
aggregate loan contraction when higher capital requirements are imposed on only a subset of 
lenders. Finally, Basten and Koch (2015) specifically focus on capital requirements targeting 
residential real estate exposures. They find that capital-constrained banks with low capital buffers 
raise their mortgage rates relatively more than their competitors in response to the introduction of a 
one percent countercyclical capital buffer on mortgage loan exposures in Switzerland.6 Furthermore, 
while banks operating a more mortgage-intensive business model also exhibit a more aggressive 
pricing reaction, liquid banks offer mortgage rates that are on average lower than those offered by 
less liquid banks. The estimated interaction effects are economically rather small (well below 10 
basis points), however. 
By providing evidence on the impact of a sectoral macroprudential measure on mortgage loan 
pricing, we contribute to this scant literature on the impact of sectoral capital requirements on bank 
                                                                  
6 Other studies that find that the size of the effect of tighter capital regulation on bank lending is associated with specific 
bank characteristics, such as the existing level of bank capitalization and banks’ business model, include Carlson et al. (2013) 
and Aiyar et al. (2014). 
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loan  pricing.  Before  turning  to  the  empirical  analysis,  we  explain  in  more  detail  the  Belgian  
macroprudential measure that is the focus of this paper. 
3 THE BELGIAN MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURE 
Macroprudential instruments targeting real estate exposures can be classified as either borrower-
based or capital-based. Borrower-based instruments act on the terms and conditions of credit, for 
example by imposing limits to the loan-to-value (the ratio between the size of the loan and the value 
of the financed property) or to the borrower’s debt service costs.7 Capital-based instruments affect 
banks’ balance sheets through changes in capital requirements, imposed either directly by setting 
higher regulatory capital ratio requirements for real estate exposures, or indirectly by acting on 
parameters, such as RW, which affect capital requirements.  
The Basel Accord foresees two possible methods for calculating capital requirements for retail 
mortgage loan exposures. The standardised (STA) approach applies a fixed RW (35 percent) to all 
exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, which is then used as a basis for computing 
the amount of capital required under Pillar I for this exposure class. The IRB approach allows banks 
to use internal models for estimating the key parameters (notably the probability of default and the 
loss given default) used as input in the Basel RW function for the calculation of the RW to be applied 
to the bank’s mortgage loan exposure.  
In Belgium, the STA approach is mainly used by small credit institutions, covering a small share of 
total mortgage loans held by the Belgian banking sector. A fact-finding exercise conducted by the 
National Bank of Belgium in 2012 revealed that RW on mortgage loans of Belgian banks using the 
IRB approach were not only substantially lower than those resulting from banks applying the STA 
approach but also on average quite low compared to those of other European countries.8 While the 
low level of IRB RW (on average 10 percent) can be justified by the absence of major downturn 
events  in  the  historical  credit  loss  data  of  the  Belgian  real  estate  market  on  which  the  model  
parameters are calibrated, the presence of pockets of vulnerabilities represented by segments of the 
outstanding mortgage loan portfolio (characterised by high loan-to-value ratios, high debt service 
ratios and long maturities) raised concerns over the resilience of Belgian banks against higher than 
expected losses that could result from abrupt developments in the Belgian real estate market. 
Against  this  background,  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium  introduced  in  December  2013  a  
macroprudential measure consisting in a 5 percentage point add-on to the RW on Belgian residential 
                                                                  
7 See for example the ESRB “Handbook on Operationalising macroprudential policy in the banking sector (2010)”. 
8  See European Banking Authority, 2013, “Third interim report on the consistency of risk-weighted assets, SME and 
residential mortgages”.   
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real estate exposures for banks calculating regulatory capital requirements through an IRB 
approach. 9  The macroprudential measure was primarily aimed at increasing banks’ resilience 
against potential losses stemming from less buoyant conditions on the residential real estate market. 
The immediate effect of the measure in terms of increased capital to absorb potential losses is 
readily measurable: as a consequence of the policy, the average RW on mortgage loan exposures used 
as input for calculating the capital requirements of Belgian IRB banks increased from 10 percent to 
15 percent. This implies that each IRB bank is required to hold on average an additional EUR 70 
million of  capital,  ranging between EUR 35 million and almost   EUR 150 million.  At  the sectoral  
level, the add-on resulted in a total additional capital requirement for all IRB banks in the sample of 
almost EUR 600 million. This represents on average about 3 percent of these banks’ outstanding 
Tier 1 capital, with a range between 0.3 percent up to almost 8 percent. 
The objective of the add-on was not to curb the supply of credit per se. In fact, the calibration of the 
measure aimed at increasing resilience while at the same time avoiding an unsettling of the market. 
Yet, to the extent that banks perceive higher capital requirements as increasing their cost of funding 
(and/or as decreasing their voluntary management buffer above minimum requirements below an 
internal or external target), they may decide to pass on this perceived increase in funding cost to 
their customers. In the following sections we aim at quantifying to what extent Belgian IRB banks 
that were affected by the macroprudential measure indeed responded to its introduction by adjusting 
their mortgage loan pricing upward. 
  
                                                                  
9 The choice to operate through RW rather than setting a higher regulatory capital requirement stems from restrictions in 
European legal framework (the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive, CRR/CRD IV) laying out the prudential rules 
for the EU banking system. 
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4 DATA 
In our analysis we consider a sample of 13 Belgian banks, of which 8 use the IRB approach for the 
calculation of regulatory capital requirement (and are therefore directly affected by the 
macroprudential measure) and 5 using the STA approach.  
The dependent variable considered in the empirical analysis is the spread between the interest rate 
applied to new mortgage loans over the swap rate. Denoting ݎ௕,௧  the  average  mortgage  loan  rate  
charged by bank ܾ  in period (month) ݐ and ݏ௕,௧ the average swap rate corresponding to the repricing 
profile of bank ܾ ’s new mortgage production10, the spread is defined as follows:  
 
ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௕,௧ = ݎ௕,௧ െ ݏ௕,௧ 
 
Data  on  mortgage  rates  on  new  loans  are  obtained  from  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium’s  MFI  
Interest Rate (MIR) statistics and swap rates are taken from Datastream. Figure 1 shows the 
dynamics of the weighted average mortgage loan spread between January 2003 and December 2015 
for IRB and STA banks respectively, whereby the weights are given by the banks’ share in total new 
mortgage loan production. Prior to 2007 mortgage loan spreads followed a declining trend, reaching 
unsustainably low levels in 2006 and 2007. After the onset of the financial crisis, Belgian banks 
raised their  mortgage loan spreads substantially,  mainly reflecting increased risk premia and the 
need to restore profitability while retrenching to core activities. To provide more background on 
these differences between the pre- and post-crisis period, the figure also displays the EONIA interest 
rate. The figure shows that there is a negative relationship between the policy rate and the mortgage 
loan spreads. In the period before the crisis, strong competition in the mortgage market in an 
environment of search for yield and general underpricing of risk, resulted in a far from perfect pass 
through of the increasing policy rate, with a consequent substantial decrease in lending spreads. 
Banks took the opportunity to restore these unsustainably low lending spreads to more sound levels 
when the policy rate was drastically cut after the onset of the financial crisis.11 During the last years 
of our sample, the low interest rate environment may have exerted further upward pressure on 
                                                                  
10 The  difference  between the  mortgage  rate  and  the  swap rate  is  only  a  proxy  for  banks’  commercial  lending  margins.  We 
account for the time to repricing in banks’ new mortgage loan production by assigning the 1 year swap rate to mortgage loans 
with time to repricing of at most 1 year, the 5 year swap rate to mortgage loans with time to repricing between 1 and 5 years, 
the 10 year swap rate to mortgage loans with time to repricing between 5 and 10 years, and the 20 year swap rate to mortgage 
loans with time to repricing of more than 10 years. 
11 An additional factor could be that during a recession, banks become more capital constrained and consequently are forced to 
increase lending margins by reducing the pass-through of a decreasing policy rate (see e.g. Roelands, 2012). 
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lending spreads due to a large amount of renegotiations of existing loan contracts.12 Nevertheless, 
average spreads have decreased somewhat again in the last months of the sample, potentially due to 
increased competition for mortgage loan volumes in an environment of market rates close to the zero 
lower bound.  
Focusing on the differences between STA and IRB banks13 reveals that, on average, IRB banks tend 
to charge somewhat higher mortgage loan spreads than STA banks (slightly above 130 basis points 
compared to 115 basis points). But overall, the lending spreads of IRB banks and STA banks exhibit 
on average a very large co-movement (the correlation between the two series amounts to 95 percent), 
suggesting the presence of common factors and/or endogenous behaviour (e.g. due to competition) 
that lead to very similar dynamics across the entire sector. 
Figure 1 - Evolution of mortgage loan spreads (in percentage): 2003m1-2015m12. 
 
Sources: NBB MIR statistics. 
In order to assess the effect of the macroprudential measure on IRB banks’ mortgage loan spreads, 
the policy variable included in the analysis is a dummy indicator representing the periods in which 
                                                                  
12 Renegotiated loans, where borrowers fix the interest rate on an existing contract at a lower interest rate, enter the data as 
new loan contracts. As there is a large administrative costs associated with getting a new credit at a bank different from the 
one that originally granted the loan, competition for renegotiated loans is likely to be lower, potentially allowing banks to 
charge higher spreads on this part of the “new” loan production. 
13 Note that the distinction between IRB and STA banks is only possible from 2008 onwards, since the possibility for banks to 
calculate capital requirements based on internal models was introduced in the Basel II framework.  
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the 5 percentage point add-on to risk weights on IRB banks’ exposures to Belgian mortgage loans is 
enforced. The add-on dummy variable is therefore set equal to one for IRB banks in the period from 
December 2013 onwards, and is equal to zero otherwise (i.e. before the introduction of the measure 
as  well  as  for  STA  banks  throughout  the  sample).  This  period  is  marked  by  the  shaded  area  in  
Figure 1. 
We consider a broad set of bank characteristics obtained from supervisory reporting14 on a solo basis 
as control variables that may explain banks’ mortgage loan pricing decision as well as the relative 
strength of their reaction to the introduction of the RW add-on. In Table 1 we present some summary 
statistics of these variables distinguishing between IRB and STA banks. The first six variables in 
Table 1 are used as common controls throughout the sample and therefore may affect the average 
lending spread across banks with different balance sheet characteristics. The table indicates that 
IRB banks are on average significantly larger than STA banks (EUR 125 billion vs EUR 5.36 billion), 
but also display a higher variation in terms of balance sheet total. IRB banks tend to be less exposed, 
at  least  in  relative  terms,  to  Belgian  mortgage  loans  compared  to  STA  banks  (18  percent  vs.  28  
percent). While the dispersion around the mean is very large for both STA and IRB banks, the latter 
tend to rely more heavily on wholesale funding sources, as revealed by the higher average loan-to-
deposit ratio. The average differences between STA and IRB banks seem relatively limited for the 
remaining three of the first six control variables.  
Table 1 Summary statistics of the bank-specific control variables 
  IRB banks STA banks 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total assets (EUR bill) 700 125.00 114.00 10.60 610.00 351 5.36 2.89 0.48 11.10 
Profit / Total assets 700 0.0019 0.0076 -0.0543 0.0126 351 0.0053 0.0050 -0.0066 0.0226 
Total loans / Deposits 700 0.9079 0.1865 0.6478 1.5026 351 0.8301 0.3847 0.0341 1.7863 
Cost / Income 700 0.6846 0.1958 0.3282 1.7596 351 0.6463 0.3364 0.0861 2.3261 
Loan loss / Total loans 700 0.0015 0.0028 -0.0017 0.0229 351 0.0010 0.0026 -0.0009 0.0194 
BE mortgage loans / Total assets 700 0.1846 0.1503 0.0183 0.5384 351 0.2809 0.1806 0.0147 0.6289 
Tier 1 capital ratio requirement 199 0.1176 0.0238 0.0925 0.1830 NA NA NA NA NA 
Additional capital / RWA 199 0.0049 0.0041 0.0004 0.0145 NA NA NA NA NA 
Additional capital / Total assets 199 0.0013 0.0008 0.0003 0.0026 NA NA NA NA NA 
Capital buffer / RWA 199 0.0369 0.0250 -0.0139 0.1217 NA NA NA NA NA 
Source: NBB. 
Notes: The distinction between IRB and STA banks exists only since January 2008. As consequence, the summary statistics presented in Table 1 
refer to the sample period 2008-2015. The number of observations for the last four control variables is lower because the Tier 1 capital ratio 
requirement  resulting  from  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium’s  SREP  decisions  is  only  available  for  the  IRB  banks  in  our  sample  and  from  2012  
onwards.  We  therefore  only  use  these  as  interaction  variables  with  the  add-on dummy  variable  and  show  summary  statistics  for  these  
observations where the add-on dummy is equal to one. 
 
                                                                  
14 The data on total assets, profits, total loans, deposits, cost-to-income ratio, loan loss ratio and Belgian mortgage loans are 
obtained from Schema A reports, whereas capital related variables are sourced from COREP. The Tier 1 capital ratio 
requirement results from the National Bank of Belgium’s Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) decisions 
regarding banks’ capital requirements.  
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The last five control variables are interacted with the add-on dummy variable to assess to what 
extent IRB banks’ response to the macroprudential measure in terms of mortgage loan pricing differs 
according to specific characteristics of IRB banks. In particular, the share of Belgian mortgage loan 
exposures  in  the  banks’  total  balance  sheet,  the  Tier  1  regulatory  capital  ratio  requirement,  the  
additional capital required15 by the measure as a share of RWA, the additional capital required by 
the measure as a share of total assets capture the relative degree to which IRB banks are affected in 
terms of additional capital requirements following the increase in the risk weight. The capital buffer 
relative to RWA variable captures the degree to which the affected banks have room to absorb this 
additional capital requirement by reducing the voluntary management buffer they hold above 
minimum  regulatory  requirements.  Table  1  shows  that  the  average  regulatory  capital  ratio  
requirement for the IRB banks in the sample is close to 12 percent and that these banks on average 
hold a voluntary management buffer of 3.7 percent above this minimum requirement. The RW add-
on results in an average 0.5 percent increase in required capital when expressed relative to RWA, 
but  this  effect  increases  up  to  1.5  percent  for  the  bank  that  is  most  affected  by  the  measure.  
Similarly, the size of the additional capital required by the RW add-on ranges between 0.03 percent 
and 0.3 percent of IRB banks’ total assets. 
Simple correlation analysis (not shown) indicates that IRB banks that are relatively more mortgage-
concentrated tend to have a lower Tier 1 capital ratio requirement. Consequently, for some banks 
these two factors may be balancing each other in determining the additional capital required by the 
RW  add-on.  Yet,  correlations  of  these  two  variables  with  the  two  variables  based  on  additional  
capital required by the RW add-on are positive (ranging between 14 percent and 93 percent). There 
seems to be no relationship between the size of the capital buffer to RWA and the other four 
variables capturing the extent to which IRB banks may be affected by the RW add-on (correlation 
coefficients  of  at  most  10  percent).  The  correlation  analysis  also  shows  that  IRB  banks  that  are  
expected to be affected more by the RW add-on tend to be the smaller IRB banks. Therefore, any 
finding  that  these  IRB  banks  respond  more  aggressively  in  terms  of  mortgage  loan  pricing  is  
unlikely to be driven by market power. 
5 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
To assess the impact of the macroprudential RW add-on on mortgage loan pricing, we estimate the 
following equation: 
                                                                  
15 The additional capital required by the measures is obtained by multiplying the amount of Belgian mortgage loans on the 
balance sheet with the bank’s Tier 1 capital requirement and the change in the mortgage loan RW introduced by the add-on 
(0.05). 
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ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௕,௧ = ߙ + ߚ௕,௧ܽ݀݀-݋݊௧ + ߜ ܺ௕,௧ିଵ + ܨܧ௕ + ܨܧ௧ + ߝ௕,௧    (1) 
where ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௕,௧  denotes the mortgage loan spread charged by bank ܾ  in month ݐ , ܽ݀݀-݋݊௧  is an 
indicator  variable  that  equals  1  for  banks  that  use  the  IRB  approach  for  determining  the  risk  
weights on mortgages during the months in which the RW add-on is in place (from December 2013 
onwards) and 0 otherwise,ܺ௕,௧ିଵ is a vector of additional bank-specific control variables, ܨܧ௕ and ܨܧ௧ 
denote bank and time fixed effects, respectively, and ߝ௕,௧ is a normally distributed error term. 
The  impact  of  the  RW  add-on  on  the  mortgage  loan  spread  is  captured  by  the  difference-in-
differences estimator ߚ௕,௧, which is defined as 
ߚ௕,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܼ௕,௧ିଵ        (2) 
where ܼ௕,௧ିଵis a vector of bank specific control variables that we interact with the add-on indicator. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௕,௧ = ߙ + ߚ଴ܽ݀݀-݋݊௧+ߚଵܼ௕,௧ିଵܽ݀݀-݋݊௧ + ߛܺ௕,௧ିଵ + ܨܧ௕ + ܨܧ௧ + ߝ௕,௧ (3) 
The parameter ߚ௕,௧ = ߚ଴ is obtained when the add-on indicator is not interacted with any control 
variables ܼ௕,௧ିଵ and therefore captures the average impact of the add-on on the IRB banks in the 
sample. When the variables in ܼ௕,௧ିଵ are included, ߚ௕,௧ equals the expression in equation (2), which 
allows us to quantify the heterogeneous reactions of mortgage loan spreads across IRB banks. 
6 RESULTS 
This  section  reports  the  results  of  the  econometric  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  Belgian  
macroprudential RW add-on on IRB banks’ mortgage loan spreads. We consider several model 
specifications and three different sample periods.  
6.1 Full sample  
 
Table 2 reports the results that are obtained when using the full sample ranging from January 2003 
to December 2015. The starting point of our analysis is a baseline model where mortgage loan 
spreads are regressed on a constant, the add-on indicator variable, a set of bank-specific variables as 
well as time and bank-specific fixed effects (Model 1). In this baseline specification, the add-on is 
estimated to have increased mortgage loan spreads, on average, by 11 basis points. Furthermore, 
some bank characteristics explain differences in mortgage loan pricing in this baseline specification. 
First, IRB banks on average tend to charge higher mortgage loan spreads (as also apparent in Figure 
13
 
 
1),  but  in  economic  terms,  the  difference  between  IRB and  STA banks’  lending  spreads  is  rather  
modest (16 basis points). Also the coefficients on total assets, the loan-to-deposit ratio and the 
domestic mortgage loan share are positive and statistically significant throughout all model 
specifications. The first implies that larger banks tend to charge, on average, higher spreads on their 
mortgage loans, probably due to their market power. Second, a smaller share of deposit funding is 
associated with higher mortgage loan spreads. In fact, a high loan-to-deposit ratio implies that a 
large share of loans is funded by sources other than customer deposits. To the extent that market 
funding is cheaper than deposit funding due to, for example, regulation on the remuneration of 
saving deposits, a stronger reliance on market funding allows banks to increase lending margins. To 
conclude, there is some evidence that mortgage-specialised banks tend to charge a higher price for 
mortgage loans, but this effect is only marginally significant. These results on the bank-specific 
control variables hold across all model specifications in Table 2.  
The subsequent specifications of the model (Model 2 to Model 6 in Table 2) extend the baseline model 
by adding one control variable at a time. More specifically, these control variables are interactions 
between the add-on dummy and bank-specific characteristics, such as the share of domestic 
mortgage loans in total assets, the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio requirement, the additional capital 
required by the measure as a share of RWA, the additional capital required by the measure as a 
share of total assets, and the banks’ capital buffer as a share of RWA. These model specifications aim 
at exploring whether the effect of the RW add-on on mortgage loan spreads differs across IRB banks, 
depending on their specific characteristics. In particular, the first four control variables are expected 
to positively affect the impact of the RW add-on on lending spreads, as they capture the relative 
degree to which IRB banks are affected in terms of additional capital requirements following the 
increase in the RW. In contrast, the capital buffer variable captures the degree to which the affected 
banks  have  room  to  absorb  this  additional  capital  requirement  by  reducing  the  voluntary  
management buffer they hold above the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio requirement and therefore is 
expected to negatively affect the impact of the RW add-on on the mortgage loan spread.  
The estimates for Model 2 reveal that, in line with the findings of Basten and Koch (2015) for the 
Swiss countercyclical capital buffer, banks for which the mortgage exposures that are affected by the 
macroprudential measure account for a larger share of the balance sheet raise the loan spreads 
significantly more after the introduction of the measure. Due to the specific real estate focus of the 
add-on, banks with a higher concentration of their assets in mortgage loan exposures experience a 
relatively stronger increase in their cost of funds, which they in turn pass on, at least partially, to 
their customers. Consistent with the findings of Carlson, et al. (2013), Aiyar et al. (2014) and Basten 
and Koch (2015) our results reveal that the capitalization characteristics of banks are a significant 
determinant of their reaction to increased capital requirements in terms of loan pricing. While the 
14
 
 
level  of  the  Tier  1  regulatory  capital  ratio  requirement  does  not  significantly  lead  to  a  higher  
increase in mortgage loan spreads (Model 3), we observe that banks for which the additional capital 
required by the macroprudential measure is relatively larger do react by raising the price of 
mortgage lending more. This effect is statistically significant only when the additional capital is 
measured in relation to total assets (Model 5), however. Finally, Model 6 shows that banks that have 
a lower capital buffer above minimum regulatory capital requirements react more strongly to the 
additional capital requirement than less capital-constrained banks. The negative and statistically 
significant  coefficient  of  the  capital  buffer  variable  implies  that  IRB  banks  that  hold  a  larger  
voluntary management capital buffer raise mortgage loan pricing by less after the introduction of 
the RW add-on.  
The last four specifications (Model 7 to 10) each consider one of the first four control variables, which 
capture the relative effect of the macroprudential measure in terms of additional required capital, in 
combination with the capital buffer variable. These specifications not only confirm the previous 
findings, but also reinforce them. In particular, in Model 9 the coefficient on the interaction between 
the add-on dummy and additional capital as a share of RWA is statistically significant (at the 10 
percent level). 
The aforementioned results indicate the add-on had a heterogeneous impact on IRB banks’ mortgage 
loan spreads. Figure 2 sheds light on the implied impact of the Belgian macroprudential measure 
across individual IRB banks for different model specifications. In the figure, dots represent IRB 
banks for which the model implied impact16 of the add-on is statistically significant (at the 95 
percent confidence level), while dashes represent those IRB banks for which the effect is not 
statistically significant. As already mentioned, the baseline model (Model 1) shows a statistically 
significant 11 basis points average effect of the RW add-on on mortgage loan spreads. The results for 
the other model specifications (Model 6 to 10) given an indication of the economic significance of the 
variation  of  individual  impacts  across  IRB  banks:  the  increase  in  mortgage  loan  spreads  as  a  
consequence of the add-on ranges between 0 and 35 bps. Overall, these findings suggest that the 
impact of the macroprudential measure on mortgage pricing is limited. 
                                                                  
16 For each IRB bank, the average impact over the months during which the RW add-on is in place is shown. 
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Figure 2 - Model implied impact of the Belgian real estate RW add-on on IRB banks’ mortgage loan 
spreads (full sample) 
 
Note: Dots represent IRB banks for which the model implied impact of the add-on is statistically significant (at the 95 percent 
confidence level), dashes represent IRB banks for which the effect is not statistically significant. 
6.2 Alternative samples 
 
To analyse whether our findings are robust to changes in the control sample considered, we repeat 
the exercise while shortening the sample before the introduction of the RW add-on to two cut-off 
points. First, as the distinction between IRB and STA banks begins only with the introduction of 
Basel II in 2008, we test robustness to excluding the pre-Basel II era by restricting the sample to 
encompass  only  the  Basel  II  period  (i.e.  starting  in  January  2008).  Second,  as  the  financial  crisis  
entailed exceptional circumstances and may have affected banks’ lending spreads in a structural 
manner, we re-estimate the models restricting the sample to the period after the aftermath of the 
financial crisis (i.e. starting in January 2011).   
Table  3  presents  the results  of  the same ten models,  relying on the sample ranging from January 
2008 to December 2015. First, the average impact of the add-on (8 basis points) estimated in Model 1 
is no longer statistically significant. Concerning the relationship between the other bank-specific 
characteristics and the pricing of mortgage loans, the baseline specification shows that the mortgage 
loan spread in IRB banks is estimated to be on average about 90 basis points higher than for STA 
banks. We no longer find a significant effect of bank size and the statistical significance of the loan-
to-deposit  ratio  reduces.  Instead,  banks’  cost  to  income  ratio  becomes  significantly  negative.  A  
possible  explanation  is  that  after  the  financial  crisis,  in  contrast  to  the  buoyant  times  before  the  
crisis, cost efficiency has increasingly become a point of attention. Therefore, in addition to cutting 
costs, banks with higher cost to income ratios may aim at raising revenues by increasing mortgage 
loan volumes through lowering their mortgage lending spreads. In addition, also the negative 
coefficient of the bank profitability variable becomes marginally significant when the sample period 
only starts in 2008. The negative relationship between bank profitability and spreads seems to be 
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
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driven by observations during the financial crisis with extremely low profitability, while at the same 
time spreads were raised to relatively high levels. As removing the pre-crisis period increases the 
weight of these observations in the sample, the significance of the negative relationship, which was 
already present in the full sample, increases somewhat. Again, these findings apply to all model 
specifications in the table. 
Concerning the contribution of bank-specific characteristics in determining the impact of the add-on 
on mortgage loan spreads (Model 2 to Model 10), the main conclusions obtained from the full sample 
continue to hold: more mortgage-specialised IRB banks, IRB banks for which the RW add-on results 
in a larger additional capital requirement relative to total assets, and capital-constrained IRB banks 
more strongly revise mortgage loan spreads upwards after the introduction of the add-on. 
Figure 3 presents the model-implied impacts of the RW add-on on individual IRB banks for the Basel 
II sample. Compared to Figure 2, the number of IRB banks for which the estimated effect of the 
macroprudential measure is statistically significant has reduced across all model specifications. Yet, 
the main finding of heterogeneous impact across IRB banks and the overall limited magnitude of the 
impact of the measure on lending spread continues to hold: the increase in mortgage loan spreads as 
a  consequence  of  the  add-on  ranges  between  0  and  30  basis  points,  with  an  average  of  a  not  
statistically significant 8 basis points. 
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Figure 3- Model implied impact of the Belgian real estate RW add-on on banks’ mortgage loan 
spreads (2008m1-2015m12) 
 
Note: dots  represent  credit  institutions  for  which  the  average  impact  of  the  add-on  as  implied  by  the  model  is  statistically  
significant (at the 95 percent confidence level), dashes represent non-statistically significant effects. 
 
As a further robustness check, Table 4 reports the results for the sample starting in 2011, thereby 
excluding the financial crisis. In the baseline specification (Model 1), the average impact of the add-
on (4 basis points) remains statistically insignificant. Regarding the additional control variables, the 
difference between spreads charged by IRB banks and those charged by STA banks further increases 
to about 150 basis points, when using the sample from 2011 to 2015. Banks with a low cost to income 
ratio still charge significantly larger mortgage loan spreads and the positive relationship between 
the loan-to-deposit ratio and lending spreads increases again, confirming that cost efficient banks 
may feel less pressure to increase mortgage loan volumes through lowering spreads and larger 
reliance on market funding allows banks to increase their lending margins. Finally, it also emerges 
that, in contrast with the results based on the full sample (Table 2), banks with a higher share of 
domestic mortgage loans on their balance sheet priced mortgage credit more aggressively. A possible 
explanation  for  this  finding  is  in  line  with  the  interpretation  for  the  cost  to  income  ratio:  as  a  
consequence of the very accommodative monetary policy stance in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, banks may support profitability through increasing mortgage loan volumes. This incentive is 
stronger for banks with a more mortgage-specialised business model, as they have fewer alternative 
income sources when net interest income is increasingly under pressure. 
While further reducing the control sample does not change the conclusion of statistically 
heterogeneous effects of the RW add-on across IRB banks, some differences compared to the previous 
results are noticeable however. In particular, whereas a larger voluntary management buffer above 
the minimum regulatory requirement still results in a lower increase in IRB banks’ lending spreads, 
the domestic mortgage loan share no longer significantly contributes in explaining the effect of the 
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
20
 
 
RW add-on on lending spreads. Instead, the level of minimum regulatory requirement significantly 
increases IRB banks’ reaction to the add-on, suggesting that banks that are relatively more affected 
increase spreads by a greater amount. In fact, the coefficient of the additional capital requirement 
relative to RWA is significant (at the 10 percent level) in Model 9. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows that reducing the control sample results in a further reduction in both the 
statistical and economic significance of the model implied impacts. Overall, the impact on mortgage 
loan  pricing  is  relatively  limited  and  is  more  homogeneous  across  banks,  with  only  a  few  banks  
raising spreads by more than 10 basis points. 
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Figure 4 - Model implied impact of the Belgian real estate RW add-on on banks’ mortgage loan 
spreads (2011m1-2014m12) 
 
Note: dots  represent  credit  institutions  for  which  the  average  impact  of  the  add-on  as  implied  by  the  model  is  statistically  
significant (at the 95 percent confidence level), dashes represent non-statistically significant effects. 
7 CONCLUSION 
By analysing the impact of a sectoral macroprudential measure on mortgage loan pricing, this paper 
contributes to the understanding of the potential impact of sectoral macroprudential capital 
requirements. Such evidence is crucial for improving the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, 
especially as analysis of the effects of sectoral capital requirements in general, and of those targeting 
real estate exposures in particular, is scant.  
Our results suggest that, in line with previous findings in the literature, (sectoral) macroprudential 
capital requirements are likely to have a heterogeneous impact across banks. In particular, we find 
robust evidence that less capital-constrained IRB banks react less strongly to the introduction of the 
RW add-on in terms of mortgage loan pricing. There is also evidence that the RW add-on has 
stronger effects on IRB banks more exposed to the macroprudential measure, i.e. those banks that 
are mortgage-specialised and/or face a higher minimum regulatory capital requirement. 
In terms of economic significance, the impact of the RW add-on on mortgage loan pricing appears to 
be relatively limited. As such, this is not surprising, as the objective of the measure was not to curb 
credit supply per se. In fact, the calibration of the measure aimed at increasing resilience while at 
the same time avoiding an unsettling of the market. Unfortunately, due to potential non-linearities 
in banks’ reactions to regulatory requirements, our estimates do not allow drawing conclusions on 
whether a stronger calibration of the measure would have had a much stronger impact on mortgage 
loan pricing. Therefore, future work is needed on further assessing whether (sectoral) capital 
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requirements are effective in curbing credit supply, or whether instead, alternative measures, such 
as borrower-based instruments (e.g. LTV caps) would be needed to achieve this objective. 
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